The Proper Role for Government, Game-Theoretically, for Smith

Andreas Ortmann, Stephen J. Meardon and Benoît Walraevens

Chapter 5 in Adam Smith’s System, 2022, pp 113-140 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract We sketch out in simple game-theoretic terms the numerous public-goods provision and externalities problems on display in particular in Book V of The Wealth of Nations. Casting these problems in these terms highlights the strategic nature of the thinking that Smith brought to the analysis of these problems. It leads us to claim that Smith—while he did not use these terms—understood well the pervasive nature of inter- and externalities, as well as the related issue of reputational enforcement.

Date: 2022
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:pshchp:978-3-030-99704-5_5

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-99704-5_5

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