Conclusion

Duncan Needham
Additional contact information
Duncan Needham: University of Cambridge

A chapter in UK Monetary Policy from Devaluation to Thatcher, 1967–82, 2014, pp 169-174 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract It was suggested in the Introduction that successful monetary policy implementation requires that all members of the macroeconomic executive be travelling like ships in a convoy — in the same direction if not always at precisely the same speed. It also requires that each ship’s crew have a clear idea of the destination. This was not the case during the two least successful periods of monetary policy examined in this book. In 1971, the Bank of England mis-sold Competition and Credit Control (CCC) to the Heath government on its supposed competitive merits. In 1980, the Thatcher government bounced the Bank into the MediumTerm Financial Strategy without any significant consultation outside the Treasury and a small group of sympathetic academics and journalists. The result, in both cases, was above-target money supply growth. In 1972–73, this was followed by higher inflation. In 1980–81, it was not.

Keywords: Monetary Policy; Money Supply; Labour Government; Income Policy; Mass Unemployment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:psitcp:978-1-137-36954-3_7

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.palgrave.com/9781137369543

DOI: 10.1057/9781137369543_7

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Palgrave Studies in the History of Finance from Palgrave Macmillan
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().