Conclusion

Ali Coşkun Tunçer
Additional contact information
Ali Coşkun Tunçer: University College London

Chapter 9 in Sovereign Debt and International Financial Control, 2015, pp 181-186 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract Sovereign debt contracts are unique as they are concluded between parties who do not enjoy the same degree of legal immunity. Despite the lack of legal enforcement by a third party in the case of a default, debtor countries are still willing to repay their debt because of the relative costs of default, which emerge due to the ability of creditors to impose effective sanctions. IFC or foreign control over the revenues of the defaulting states was a commonly adopted form of enforcement in the Middle East and the Balkans before 1914. The justification for such a control over state finances in the eyes of contemporary creditors was relatively straightforward thanks to particular characteristics of sovereign debt contracts, which were secured with future revenues of debtor governments from certain resources.

Keywords: Middle East; Debtor Government; Sovereign Debt; Debtor Country; International Financial Market (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:psitcp:978-1-137-37854-5_9

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.palgrave.com/9781137378545

DOI: 10.1057/9781137378545_9

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Palgrave Studies in the History of Finance from Palgrave Macmillan
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().