The Political Economy of Central Banking: From Keynesianism to Inflation-targeting

Daniela Gabor

Chapter 2 in Central Banking and Financialization, 2011, pp 15-50 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract Central banks, as Charles Goodhart (1988) put it, are institutions best described by the Chinese curse “May you live in interesting times.” Indeed, one recurring theme of economic policy discussions throughout the 20th century, intensely debated during times of crisis, focused on the relationship between central banks, governments, and financial markets: should or indeed could central banks stay above politics? Was there a special case to be made for central-bank intervention during crisis, and what form should those interventions take?

Keywords: Interest Rate; Monetary Policy; Central Bank; Money Supply; Money Market (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:stuchp:978-0-230-29504-9_2

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DOI: 10.1057/9780230295049_2

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