Corporate Governance in Transformation Economies: A Comparative Perspective

Bruno Dallago

Chapter 1 in Corporate Restructuring and Governance in Transition Economies, 2007, pp 15-39 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract Standard economics has supposed for a long time that the economy is coordinated by the price mechanism and that no explicit governance problem is involved. However, Coase has proven that this description is only partial, Berle and Means have stressed that ownership and control of firms are often separated, and later on Williamson has demonstrated that hierarchies play a fundamental role. Coase’s path-breaking contribution has been the starting point of a burgeoning literature on the nature of the firm. This literature splits the problem into two parts that concern first, the firm boundaries and their determination, and, second and given those boundaries, the way in which the different constituents of the firm are coordinated and the residual income or residual decision-making power (given incomplete or missing contracts) is allocated.

Keywords: Corporate Governance; Minority Shareholder; Investment Fund; Transformation Economy; Residual Income (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:stuchp:978-0-230-80151-6_2

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DOI: 10.1057/9780230801516_2

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