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Dynamic cooperative models of coalition formation and the core

Péter Szikora

from Óbuda University, Keleti Faculty of Business and Management

Abstract: Cooperative games model situations where the actors can collaborate, can form coalitions. We know many static models, but our world is more complex. Despite the fact that there have been several experimental studies on coalition formation there are only very few theoretical papers dealing with the problem in a dynamic context. These papers are not only few in number, but the presented concepts are poorly related. In this paper I discuss two approaches: I explain the process of dynamic coalition formation, and I look at and review a learning model. After it I show some paper about the core. The main aspect is how can reach the core.

Keywords: game theory; cooperative games; dynamic coalition; equilibrium; core (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
ISBN: 9786155018329
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