If Stable and Efficient Banks Are Such a Good Idea, Why Are They So Rare?

Charles Calomiris and Stephen H. Haber
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Stephen H. Haber: Hoover Institution, Stanford University

A chapter in Fragile by Design: The Political Origins of Banking Crises and Scarce Credit, 2014 from Princeton University Press

Abstract: Why are banking systems unstable in so many countries--but not in others? The United States has had twelve systemic banking crises since 1840, while Canada has had none. The banking systems of Mexico and Brazil have not only been crisis prone but have provided miniscule amounts of credit to business enterprises and households. Analyzing the political and banking history of the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, Mexico, and Brazil through several centuries, Fragile by Design demonstrates that chronic banking crises and scarce credit are not accidents due to unforeseen circumstances. Rather, these fluctuations result from the complex bargains made between politicians, bankers, bank shareholders, depositors, debtors, and taxpayers. The well-being of banking systems depends on the abilities of political institutions to balance and limit how coalitions of these various groups influence government regulations. Fragile by Design is a revealing exploration of the ways that politics inevitably intrudes into bank regulation. Charles Calomiris and Stephen Haber combine political history and economics to examine how coalitions of politicians, bankers, and other interest groups form, why some endure while others are undermined, and how they generate policies that determine who gets to be a banker, who has access to credit, and who pays for bank bailouts and rescues.

Keywords: fragile; design; politics; political; banking; crisis; crises; scarce; credit; United States; U.S.; Canada; Mexico; Brazil; business; United Kingdom; U.K.; fluctuations; tax; government; regulation; history; policy; policies; bailout; rescue (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
ISBN: 9780691155241
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Related works:
Chapter: If Stable and Efficient Banks Are Such a Good Idea, Why Are They So Rare? (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pup:chapts:10177-1

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