Shareholding Strategies in Dual-Channel Supply Chains with Parallel Imports

Jinyu Zhang ()
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Jinyu Zhang: Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, School of Business Administration

A chapter in Proceedings of the 2026 4th International Conference on Digital Economy and Management Science (CDEMS 2026), 2026, pp 103-112 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Parallel imports, where genuine products are sold through unauthorized channels at lower prices, create significant channel conflicts in modern supply chains. This study develops a game-theoretic model to examine how equity-based coordination mechanisms—specifically forward, backward, and cross-shareholding strategies—can mitigate these conflicts between manufacturers and authorized retailers. Using a three-party Stackelberg game framework with numerical analysis, we find that: (1) cross-shareholding achieves Pareto improvements when the forward shareholding ratio $$k\in [\text{0.3,0.5}]$$ k ∈ [ 0.3,0.5 ] and backward ratio $$j\in [\text{0.2,0.4}]$$ j ∈ [ 0.2,0.4 ] ; (2) this bilateral equity arrangement simultaneously increases manufacturer profits by 18%, retailer profits by 21%, and quality assurance investments by 31%; (3) consumer trust levels and parallel import costs significantly influence optimal shareholding configurations. Our findings provide strategic guidance for brand manufacturers managing gray market challenges through equity-based channel coordination.

Keywords: Parallel imports; Shareholding strategy; Dual-channel supply chain; Game theory; Pareto improvement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:advbcp:978-94-6239-699-9_13

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DOI: 10.2991/978-94-6239-699-9_13

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