Tripartite Evolutionary Game of Government-Industry-University in Seasonal-Transportation of Freight Enterprises Under the Background of Carbon-Peaking and Carbon-Neutrality Goals

Kaiwei Jia and Xia Wu ()
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Kaiwei Jia: Liaoning Technical University, School of Business and Management
Xia Wu: Liaoning Technical University, School of Business and Management

A chapter in Proceedings of the 2023 4th International Conference on Management Science and Engineering Management (ICMSEM 2023), 2024, pp 489-504 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract China is now the world’s highest carbon emission country. All circles focus is how to achieve carbon neutrality in just 40 years. China’s carbon neutrality path will directly affect the future of the global industrial layout and investment direction. It is an important measure to promote the realization of carbon neutrality in the Chinese transportation industry through the collaborative innovation of seasonal transportation and government-industry-university. In this paper, under the dual-carbon background, the tripartite collective innovation game payment matrix of quarterly transportation of freight enterprises, universities, and governments is established. Using the triple evolutionary game method does not appear to modify the subject of the evolutionary stability of each participant’s strategy selection. The influence of relevant parameters on the tripartite strategy selection is studied by Matlab numerical simulation. The results show government’s incentive cost to enterprises and universities will affect the probability of the government’s choice of incentive behavior. The amount of carbon tax paid by freight transportation enterprises can affect the probability of seasonal transportation and government incentive and supervision behavior of freight transportation enterprises. The research funds paid by freight transport enterprises to universities will affect the probability of strategic choice of both enterprises and universities.

Keywords: tripartite evolutionary game; government-industry-university collaborative innovation; seasonal transportation; carbon peaking and carbon neutrality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.2991/978-94-6463-256-9_50

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