The Effect of Executives’ Self-interested Selling on the Quality of Information Disclosure

Zhe Xu
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Zhe Xu: University of Shandong Normal University, School of Business

A chapter in Proceedings of the 2023 5th International Conference on Economic Management and Cultural Industry (ICEMCI 2023), 2024, pp 405-410 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Based on the annual data of Chinese listed companies from 2008 to 2021, this paper employs a panel regression model to empirically examine the impact of executives’ opportunistic selling on the quality of information disclosure. The findings indicate that managers’ opportunistic selling significantly diminishes the quality of information disclosure. Moreover, R&D manipulation partially mediates the relationship between managers’ opportunistic selling and the quality of information disclosure, while enhancing internal control quality mitigates the adverse effects caused by managers’ opportunistic selling on the quality of information disclosure.

Keywords: executives selling; opportunistic behaviors; information disclosure; R&D manipulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:advbcp:978-94-6463-368-9_47

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DOI: 10.2991/978-94-6463-368-9_47

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