Economic Analysis of Accident Concealment

Li Wang (), Chenyu Ma () and Chaohua Li ()
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Li Wang: Xi’an University of Science and Technology, College of Safety Science and Engineering
Chenyu Ma: Xi’an University of Science and Technology, College of Safety Science and Engineering
Chaohua Li: Xi’an University of Science and Technology, College of Safety Science and Engineering

A chapter in Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Financial Innovation and Economic Development (ICFIED 2024), 2024, pp 89-96 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract In order to deeply reveal the economic relationship between the main stakeholders of accident concealment, this paper constructed a “principal-agent” model and incorporated rent-seeking behavior into the model, and analyzed the two cases of agent corruption and rent-seeking corruption respectively. The results show that: Agent corruption can be avoided by reducing the benefits of corruption and weakening the agent’s function in the distribution of public power. The high cost of rent-seeking will increase the probability that rent-seekers will choose to conceal accidents. The cost of the inspection set by the client should not be too high. Control measures such as rectifying the law enforcement team, encouraging multi-party supervision, and raising the threshold for rent-seeking can effectively reduce the occurrence of accident concealment.

Keywords: Accident concealment; corrupt; Principal-agent; Rent-seeking; Security management (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.2991/978-94-6463-408-2_11

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