Research on the Evolutionary Game Mechanism of Carbon Emission Data Supervisory from the Perspective of Law-Economy Synergy

Yinghui Chi (), Fuyuan Yang, Xiaomin Yang and Yangguo Hu
Additional contact information
Yinghui Chi: China University of Petroleum (East China)
Fuyuan Yang: China University of Petroleum (East China)
Xiaomin Yang: China University of Petroleum (East China)
Yangguo Hu: China University of Petroleum (East China)

A chapter in Proceedings of the 2025 3rd International Academic Conference on Management Innovation and Economic Development (MIED 2025), 2025, pp 1127-1143 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Under China's “dual carbon” goals, carbon emission data supervision faces coordination dilemmas between legal constraints and economic incentives. This paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model involving the government, energy enterprises, and Third-party Verification Institutions. Using numerical simulation, it reveals the dynamic evolution path and equilibrium conditions. Key findings include: 1) A significant synergistic effect exists between legal constraints and economic incentives; 2) The government’s minimum penalty intensity for data falsification must exceed enterprises’ carbon data management costs; 3) Enterprises’ internal management costs must achieve systematic risk control within acceptable ranges; 4) TPVIs’ verification standards must balance accuracy with stakeholder acceptability to reach high-efficiency equilibrium. A law-economy synergistic policy framework is proposed, utilizing legal “hard constraints” and economic “soft constraints” to resolve “high-cost Strong Supervision” and “low-efficiency Weak Supervision” dilemmas, promoting “Active Emission Reduction” and ensuring carbon market fairness.

Keywords: Energy Enterprises; Carbon Emission Data Supervision; Evolutionary Game; Legal-economic Synergy; Policy Design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:advbcp:978-94-6463-835-6_121

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/9789464638356

DOI: 10.2991/978-94-6463-835-6_121

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Advances in Economics, Business and Management Research from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().