One-Dimensional Public Goods in Models of Alliance

Toshihiro Ihori (), Martin McGuire () and Shintaro Nakagawa ()
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Toshihiro Ihori: National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies
Shintaro Nakagawa: Konan University

Chapter Chapter 3 in International Governance and Risk Management, 2019, pp 57-88 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract An interesting application of non-cooperative private funding of public goodsPublic goods arises in international securityInternational security and national defenseNational defense. In their classical article on the economic theory of alliances, Olson and Zeckhauser (1966) demonstrated that countries may allocate some fraction of national incomeNational income to international (or regional) public goodsPublic goods (for example, special trading agreements, formation of international organizations, military preparedness, active international diplomacy, foreign aidForeign aid) to reduce regional and international tension and to avoid random emergency costs.

Date: 2019
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DOI: 10.1007/978-981-13-8875-0_3

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