Defense Expenditures and Allied Cooperation in Conflicting Alliances

Toshihiro Ihori (), Martin McGuire () and Shintaro Nakagawa ()
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Toshihiro Ihori: National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies
Shintaro Nakagawa: Konan University

Chapter Chapter 4 in International Governance and Risk Management, 2019, pp 89-106 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract This chapter investigates how the cooperation of members of an allied bloc influences their welfare when that bloc opposes another bloc. This question is related to cooperative and non-cooperative defense spending in the confronting blocs such as the NATONorth Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the WTOWarsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) in the Cold WarCold War. By addressing this question, we can explore how voluntary provisionVoluntary provision of an international public good within allied countries protects against national emergency from the adversarial allianceAlliance.

Date: 2019
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:advchp:978-981-13-8875-0_4

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DOI: 10.1007/978-981-13-8875-0_4

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