Conclusions

Georgios I. Zekos
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Georgios I. Zekos: International Hellenic University

Chapter Chapter 13 in Artificial Intelligence and Competition, 2023, pp 417-426 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract The digital economy, while delivering many benefits, at the same time, is gradually captured and distorted and so markets may seem competitive, yet are colonized by selected innovation. While antitrust law promotes competition, antitrust enforcement has been undermined under the idea that market power is rationalized by economic efficiency. Antitrust is slow for the reason that it is enforced through court orders that require time-consuming lawsuits. Thus, it is vital that antitrust rules minimize the costs of judicial error in digital markets.

Date: 2023
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-48083-6_13

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