 Applications for Civil Conflict StudiesChase C. Englund
Chapter Chapter 13 in The Politics of Attracting Investment, 2024, pp 239-256 from Springer Abstract: Abstract This chapter further extends the theoretical framework established in the prior chapters of this book to develop a set of hypotheses relating to the political economy of civil conflict. Specifically, this chapter predicts that in nondemocratic states, the number of competing economic elites is positively associated with the probability of civil conflict, a result of greater competition over public policy in a weak institutional context spilling over into violence. In democratic states, the number of competing economic elites is negatively associated with the probability of civil conflict, a result of greater competition over public policy providing an incentive to rein in the risk of conflict with stronger institutional commitments. These predictions are substantiated empirically using data from V-Dem and Polity V. This chapter also explores an important conditioning variable, which is the presence of military elites. Because military elites largely control the use of force, their relative number is also important. States with few economic elites and also fewer military elites are more at risk for conflict outcomes because elites have a stronger incentive to ally and pursue private goods through extralegal means. Date: 2024 There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:conchp:978-3-031-74951-3_13 Ordering information: This item can be ordered from DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-74951-3_13 Access Statistics for this chapter More chapters in Contributions to Economics from Springer |
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