Applications for International Relations Theory

Chase C. Englund
Additional contact information
Chase C. Englund: U.S. Department of the Treasury

Chapter Chapter 14 in The Politics of Attracting Investment, 2024, pp 257-274 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract This chapter further extends the theoretical framework established in the prior chapters of this book to develop a set of hypotheses relating to the political economy of international relations. This chapter predicts that in both democratic and nondemocratic states, the number of competing economic elites is related to the conduct of foreign policy, specifically the degree to which foreign policy actions and objectives are oriented around the provision of private or public goods. In states where the number of economic elites is smaller, leaders are more likely to be incentivized to pursue private goods in foreign policy engagements, for example by securing market access for particular firms. In states where the number of economic elites is greater, leaders are more likely to be incentivized to pursue public goods in foreign policy engagements, for example by supporting broad trade agreements focused on market access. These propositions are explored using a qualitative case analysis comparing US and Chinese foreign policy objectives.

Date: 2024
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:conchp:978-3-031-74951-3_14

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/9783031749513

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-74951-3_14

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Contributions to Economics from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().