Adam Smith’s Two Moralities
Douglas Den Uyl ()
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Douglas Den Uyl: Liberty Fund
A chapter in Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations After 250 Years, 2026, pp 109-127 from Springer
Abstract:
Abstract Smith scholars today typically believe that there is no “das Adam Smith problem.” That is to say, there is no general contradiction between doctrines advanced in The Theory of Moral Sentiments and those advanced in The Wealth of Nations. However true that may be, reading The Wealth of Nations on morality is not much like doing so in The Theory of Moral Sentiments. I begin by showing this with Smith’s discussion of “two moralities” in Book V of The Wealth of Nations. This section is devoid of any mention of the moral tools found in The Theory of Moral Sentiments such as the impartial spectator or the correspondence of sentiments. From that recognition, the paper moves on to discuss various aspects of Smith’s project that might help explain why Smith does what he does with the “two moralities.” Such analysis leads us to conclude, not surprisingly, that prudence (along with commutative justice) is the fundamental virtue in The Wealth of Nations, that experience is the source of moral norms, that happiness is the end for ethics, and that there is a bias toward social happiness.
Date: 2026
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:conchp:978-3-032-32299-9_6
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-032-32299-9_6
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