Winning Coalition Size and the Use of Anti-dumping

Patricia Wruuck

Chapter Chapter 3 in The Political Economy of Anti-dumping Protection, 2015, pp 39-78 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract This chapter examines the effect of institutions on the use of AD measures. While existing research points to a positive relationship between democratic institutions and trade openness in general as well as traditional tariffs (see Sect. 2.1.2 ), their impact has been tested less extensively for other specific trade policy instruments. This analysis looks at measures of contingent protection, notably AD.

Keywords: Trade Policy; Public Good Provision; Winning Coalition; Institutional Rule; Predatory Price (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:conchp:978-3-319-11224-4_3

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-11224-4_3

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