Conflicts as Zero-Sum Games

Lucía Martínez Ordóñez
Additional contact information
Lucía Martínez Ordóñez: Ruhr University Bochum

Chapter Chapter 4 in Military Operational Planning and Strategic Moves, 2017, pp 25-36 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Over the past decade, the term “asymmetric” has begun to convey two meanings within the military field. First, it has been used to refer to a special, i.e. “asymmetric”, kind of threat that countries are facing, and second, it describes the military conflicts resulting from these threats. It thereby refers to the nature of the conflict, and even though the sources of asymmetry in a conflict are varied, usually it is the asymmetry of force that is responsible for all others. On the other hand, though, it must not be used in a too narrow sense: as in real life any two opposing forces most likely command unequal defense budgets and/or are composed of different kinds of units, military conflicts could of course be described as being “asymmetric”, except that then examples for “symmetric” conflicts would at best be extremely rare indeed.

Keywords: Nash Equilibrium; Mixed Strategy; Pure Strategy; Weak Actor; Weak Force (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:conchp:978-3-319-56108-0_4

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/9783319561080

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-56108-0_4

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Contributions to Economics from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().