The Decision to Patent with Horizontal Product Differentiation

Alexandra Zaby

Chapter Chapter 4 in The Decision to Patent, 2010, pp 87-122 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract In this chapter we introduce the patenting decision into an oligopolistic model of horizontally differentiated products. The analysis presented here in large parts follows Zaby (2009b).We assume that a drastic product innovation is released on a new market where rivals may enter with non-infringing products as long as patent protection is not perfect. Product characteristics are assumed to be continuously distributed on a circle of unit-circumference where a patent protects a given range on the circle from the entry of rival firms.

Keywords: Critical Threshold; Reservation Price; Market Entry; Social Welfare Function; Patent Protection (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:conchp:978-3-7908-2612-8_4

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-7908-2612-8_4

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