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Ownership Concentration and Performance of Privately-Held Firms with Multiple Owners and the Moderating Effect of Managerial and Corporate Ownership: Evidence from Post-Socialist European Countries

Aleš Kubíček () and Ondřej Machek ()
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Aleš Kubíček: University of Economics
Ondřej Machek: University of Economics

Chapter Chapter 2 in Corporate Governance in Central Europe and Russia, 2020, pp 11-31 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract This chapter examines the relationship between ownership concentration and performance of privately-held firms with multiple owners in a stratified random sample of 4500 Czech, Slovak and Polish firms. Based on hierarchical regression analysis on data from 2009–2013, the results indicate the existence of an inverted U-shaped relationship between ownership concentration and performance. Corporate ownership and managerial ownership have both significant moderating effects on this relationship. If a large part of shares is held by corporate owners, firms will perform better when ownership concentration is high, and if owners strongly participate in management, firms will perform better when ownership concentration is low.

Date: 2020
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:csrchp:978-3-030-39504-9_2

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-39504-9_2

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