Reassessing Carillion’s Collapse from Corporate Constitutional Perspective

Yifei Yang ()
Additional contact information
Yifei Yang: Capital University of Economics and Business

Chapter Chapter 7 in Corporate Collapse and Corporate Governance, 2025, pp 155-178 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract This chapter applies the corporate constitutional paradigm to Carillion’s governance failure as an alternative to the contractual model. It examines internal governance, including corporate constitution, decision-making, legitimacy of corporate power, and mechanisms of accountability, deliberation, and contestability, as well as external governance, including the roles of regulators, government, and law. Through a speculative approach, it assesses how embedding corporate constitutionalism might have addressed systemic flaws and considers its potential to prevent similar corporate collapses.

Date: 2025
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:csrchp:978-981-96-9666-6_7

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/9789819696666

DOI: 10.1007/978-981-96-9666-6_7

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in CSR, Sustainability, Ethics & Governance from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().