Macroeconomic Risk, Fiscal Policy Rules and Aggregate Volatility in Asymmetric Currency Unions: A Behavioral Perspective

Christian Proaño and Benjamin Lojak ()
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Benjamin Lojak: Otto-Friedrich-Universität Bamberg

A chapter in Inequality and Finance in Macrodynamics, 2017, pp 221-242 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract This paper studies the dynamics of sovereign risk, fiscal policy and the macroeconomy in a two-country monetary union framework under the assumption of a heterogeneous perception of the determinants of sovereign risk by the government and the market participants. The macro-economic volatility resulting from various types of fiscal policy rules aimed at the stabilization of sovereign debt is investigated through numerical simulations. Among other things, these simulations show that an extreme focus on debt stabilization can be counterproductive if the financial markets care more about the country’s output gap.

Keywords: Fiscal Policy; Euro Area; Monetary Union; Government Bond; Sovereign Debt (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Working Paper: Macroeconomic Risk, Fiscal Policy Rules and Aggregate Volatility in Asymmetric Currency Unions: A Behavioral Perspective (2013)
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-54690-2_10

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