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International Emission Policy with Lobbying and Technological Change

Tapio Palokangas

A chapter in Dynamic Systems, Economic Growth, and the Environment, 2010, pp 161-181 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract I examine emission policy in a union of countries when production in any country incurs emissions that pollute all over the union, but efficiency in production is improved by research and development (R&D). I compare four cases: Laissez-faire, Pareto optimal policy, and the case of a self-interested central planner that decides on nontraded or traded emission quotas. I show that with nontraded quotas, the growth rate is socially optimal, but welfare sub-optimal. Trade in quotas speeds up growth from the initial position of laissez-faire, but slows down growth from the initial position of nontraded quotas.

Keywords: Technological Change; Total Factor Productivity; Labor Input; Pareto Optimum; Optimal Program (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:dymchp:978-3-642-02132-9_8

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-02132-9_8

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