An Algorithmic Equilibrium Solution for n-Person Dynamic Stackelberg Difference Games with Open-Loop Information Pattern

Philipp Hungerländer () and Reinhard Neck ()
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Philipp Hungerländer: Klagenfurt University

A chapter in Computational Methods in Economic Dynamics, 2011, pp 197-214 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract In this paper, extensions are presented for the open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium solution of n-person discrete-time affine-quadratic dynamic games of prespecified fixed duration to allow for an arbitrary number of followers and the possibility of algorithmic implementation. First we prove a general result about the existence of a Stackelberg equilibrium solution with one leader and arbitrarily many followers in n-person discrete-time deterministic infinite dynamic games of prespecified fixed duration with open-loop information pattern. Then this result is applied to affine-quadratic games. Thereby we get a system of equilibrium equations that can easily be used for an algorithmic solution of the given Stackelberg game.

Date: 2011
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:dymchp:978-3-642-16943-4_10

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-16943-4_10

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