International Biodiversity Management with Technological Change

Tapio Palokangas

A chapter in Green Growth and Sustainable Development, 2013, pp 69-85 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract This document examines a group of countries where the conservation of land benefits anybody through biodiversity. All countries produce the same good from labor and land and improve their productivity through abatement investment. The international agency performing biodiversity management is self-interested. Three cases of biodiversity management are compared: (i) laissez-faire, (ii) the regulation of land use, and (iii) subsidies to the conservation of land. The results are the following. Regulation promotes biodiversity, abatement and welfare. Because subsidies must be financed by distortionary taxes, the replacement of regulation by subsidies hampers biodiversity, abatement and welfare. Applied to NATURA 2000 in the EU, this suggests that regulation without any budget is the appropriate degree of authority for the Commission.

Keywords: European Union; Total Factor Productivity; International Agency; Pareto Optimum; Direct Regulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:dymchp:978-3-642-34354-4_4

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-34354-4_4

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