Robust Markov Perfect Equilibria in a Dynamic Choice Model with Quasi-hyperbolic Discounting

Łukasz Balbus (), Anna Jaśkiewicz and Andrzej Nowak
Additional contact information
Łukasz Balbus: University of Zielona Góra

A chapter in Dynamic Games in Economics, 2014, pp 1-22 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract A stochastic dynamic choice model with the transition probability depending on an unknown parameter is specified and analysed in this chapter. The main feature in our model is an application of the quasi-hyperbolic discounting concept to describe the situation in which agent’s preferences may hinge on time. This requirement, in turn, leads to a non-cooperative infinite horizon stochastic game played by a countably many selves representing him during the play. As a result, we provide two existence theorems for a robust Markov perfect equilibrium (RMPE) and discuss its properties.

Keywords: Markov Perfect Equilibrium; Dynamic Choice Model; Quasi-hyperbolic Discounting; Stochastic Games; Markov Strategies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:dymchp:978-3-642-54248-0_1

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/9783642542480

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-54248-0_1

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Dynamic Modeling and Econometrics in Economics and Finance from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().