On Some Aspects of Scoring Auctions

Krishnendu Dastidar

Chapter Chapter 4 in Oligopoly, Auctions and Market Quality, 2017, pp 113-154 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Scoring auctionsAuction are important mechanisms for procurement in both developed and developing countries. Till date the literature has mainly dealt with cases where the scoring rule is quasilinear. Very few papers in the literature have dealt with non-quasilinear scoring rules. In chapter 4 we fill this gap. Under some conditions we derive a clear ranking of the expected scores in first-score and second-score auctions. We show how in many cases second price auctions lead to higher expected score. We show with the help of two examples, that while expected score may be higher with second-score auctions, total expected welfare need not be higher.

Keywords: Opinion Score; Second-price Auction; Equilibrium Score; Quote Character; Procurement Auctions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:eclchp:978-4-431-55396-0_4

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DOI: 10.1007/978-4-431-55396-0_4

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