Incentives, Inequality and the Allocation of Aid When Conditionality Doesn’t Work: An Optimal Nonlinear Taxation Approach

Ravi Kanbur and Matti Tuomala ()
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Matti Tuomala: University of Tampere

Chapter Chapter 16 in Poverty, Inequality and Development, 2006, pp 331-351 from Springer

Keywords: Social Welfare Function; Recipient Country; Inequality Aversion; Incentive Compatibility Constraint; Recipient Government (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Working Paper: Incentives, Inequality and the Allocation of Aid When Conditionality Doesn't Work: An Optimal Nonlinear Taxation Approach (2001)
Working Paper: Incentives, Inequality and the Allocation of Aid When Conditionality Doesn't Work: An Optimal Nonlinear Taxation Approach (2001)
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DOI: 10.1007/0-387-29748-0_16

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