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Bootleggers and Baptists in the Garden of Good and Evil: Understanding America’s Entangled Economy

Dima Yazji Shamoun () and Bruce Yandle ()
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Dima Yazji Shamoun: University of Texas at Austin
Bruce Yandle: George Mason University

A chapter in Law and Economics in Europe and the U.S, 2016, pp 31-54 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract The U.S. is a regulatory state where major industries and firms throughout the economy are subject to extensive command and control regulation. Put another way, America is an entangled economy where concepts of seperate private from public enterprises and occasional intervention to affect market outcomes no longer apply. There is regulation at every margin. Drawing on the Bootlegger/Baptist theory, this chapter seeks to explain how special interest group demand for command-and-control regulation, as opposed to other forms of regulation, such as the use of performance standards and economic incentives, has accommodated and reinforced the rise of the regulatory state. The chapter traces the evolution of regulation theory to the present and then provides evidence on the rise of regulation and its effects.

Keywords: Public Good; Interest Group; Private Good; Regulatory Instrument; Social Regulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:euhchp:978-3-319-47471-7_3

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-47471-7_3

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