Marquis de Condorcet and the Two-dimensional Jury Model

Manfred J. Holler ()
Additional contact information
Manfred J. Holler: Center of Conflict Resolution (CCR), University of Hamburg

A chapter in Law and Economics in Europe and the U.S, 2016, pp 155-169 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract The two-dimensional jury model, which is the core of this paper, demonstrates the two, partly conflicting, dimensions in Condorcet’s work and life. There is the dimension of enlightenment, reflected in Condorcet’s jury theorem, i.e., the belief that there is some truth can be approximated in collective decision-making. On the other hand, there is creed that individual preferences are the building blocks of the society with the consequence of inevitable conflicts in aggregating them. This paper combines the idea of winning a maximum of votes in a voting game with utility maximization that derives from the winning proposition. The model assumes a first mover, the plaintiff, and a second mover, the counsel of the defendant. Typically, these agents represent parties that have conflicting interests. Here they face an arbitration court in the form of jury that consists of three voters such that no single voter has a majority of votes. The agents are interested in both gaining the support of a majority of jury members and seeing their preferred alternative selected as outcome. It will be demonstrated that equilibrium decision-making can be derived for this model.

Keywords: Condorcet’s jury theorem; Voting paradox; Majority cycle; Aggregation of preferences; Agenda setting; Arbitration; Arbitration court; Collective decision-making (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:euhchp:978-3-319-47471-7_9

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/9783319474717

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-47471-7_9

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in The European Heritage in Economics and the Social Sciences from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().