Democracy, Liberalism, and Moral Order in Wilhelm Röpke: A Comparison with James M. Buchanan

Gabriele Ciampini ()
Additional contact information
Gabriele Ciampini: University of Florence

A chapter in Wilhelm Röpke (1899–1966), 2018, pp 237-257 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract By analyzing how excessive state intervention leads to the bureaucratization of the economy and primarily benefits a class of politicians and bureaucrats, Wilhelm Röpke anticipated core elements of Public Choice Theory. In Ciampini’s account, Röpke described the behavior of special interest groups who exploited the dynamics of the welfare state’s growth, pressuring politicians and bureaucrats to extract additional privileges. According to Ciampini, Röpke conceived a series of public choice arguments before key concepts like “rent-seeking” were formulated by Public Choice theorists James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock. In this analysis, Röpke’s understanding of the political process comes close to Buchanan’s research programs of Public Choice and of Constitutional Political Economy.

Date: 2018
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:euhchp:978-3-319-68357-7_16

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/9783319683577

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-68357-7_16

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in The European Heritage in Economics and the Social Sciences from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().