Cooperation in Three-Players Sequential Games: A Pilot Experiment

Stefano Pagliarani

A chapter in Eurasian Business and Economics Perspectives, 2021, pp 75-84 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Cooperation has been the focus of many experimental articles in economics, due to its importance in evolutionary and social issues. The existing studies mostly focus on sequential games with two players, or on simultaneous games with more than two players. Little attention has been devoted to the study of sequential games with more than two players. The pilot experiment presented here aims at exploring this untouched area, focusing on a simple cooperation game with three players in a sequential setting. The results show that, contrary to theoretical predictions, players are willing to cooperate in a substantial way, even without individual incentives to do so. Moreover, indirect reciprocity assumes some significance, even if its effects cannot be fully determined from the gathered data. Though these results do not allow to draw any clear-cut conclusion by themselves, they could represent a good starting point for future research on this topic.

Keywords: Cooperation; Reciprocity; Game theory; Experimental economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:eurchp:978-3-030-71869-5_5

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-71869-5_5

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