Preconditions of a Monetary Union

Mike Tsionas

Chapter Chapter 5 in The Euro and International Financial Stability, 2014, pp 23-26 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Several people pose the question: Why would the EU not accept the conversion of all government bonds to the so called Eurobonds? That would be a reasonable idea, if the Bureaucracy of the EU did not have its own objectives which are quite different from national objectives, a fact that would never occur in the US or the different regions of the UK.

Keywords: Monetary Policy; Fiscal Policy; Public Debt; Government Bond; Currency Union (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:fimchp:978-3-319-01171-4_5

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-01171-4_5

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