The Scope for a Budgetary Union in the European Monetary Union

Oscar Bajo-Rubio () and Carmen Diaz-Roldan

A chapter in The Euro and the Crisis, 2017, pp 357-366 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract In the scenario of the Economic and Monetary Union of the European Union (EU), where the EU budget is not able to play the role of a centralized fiscal policy instrument, proposals for a budgetary union have been widely discussed. As a contribution to the debate, in this chapter we will discuss the macroeconomics of a monetary union focusing our analysis on the scope for coordination of budgetary policies. When using the public deficit as policy instrument, we will identify the full cooperation of fiscal policies with a budgetary or fiscal union. The results will allow us to explore the role that fiscal integration can play in reducing the incidence and severity of future crises, and will also allow us to derive under which circumstances a budgetary union would not be advisable. In particular, we will show to which extent a fully coordinated fiscal performance of the Eurozone’s members should be complemented with fiscal discipline, a zone-wide system of transfers, or an automatic mechanism to ensure the stability of the Eurozone.

Date: 2017
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:fimchp:978-3-319-45710-9_21

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-45710-9_21

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