Adaptive Agents in Coalition Formation Games

Alex K. Chavez ()
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Alex K. Chavez: University of Pennsylvania

A chapter in Formal Modelling in Electronic Commerce, 2005, pp 421-443 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Coalition formation games form an important subclass of mixed-motive strategic situations, in which players must negotiate competitively to secure contracts. This paper compares the performance of two learning mechanisms, reinforcement learning and counterfactual reasoning, for modeling play in such games. Previous work [CK04] found that while the former type of agent converged to theoretical solutions, they did so much more slowly than human subjects. The present work addresses this issue by allowing agents to update extensively based on counterfactual reasoning.

Keywords: Reinforcement Learning; Coalition Formation; Coalition Structure; Aspiration Level; Mean Square Deviation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:ihichp:978-3-540-26989-2_16

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DOI: 10.1007/3-540-26989-4_16

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