Investigations of Granularity and Payoffs in 2×2 Games under Replicator Dynamics

Sofia Chajadine (), Daniel Mack () and Aaron Jeffrey Slan ()
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Sofia Chajadine: University of Pennsylvania
Daniel Mack: University of Pennsylvania
Aaron Jeffrey Slan: University of Pennsylvania

A chapter in Formal Modelling in Electronic Commerce, 2005, pp 509-527 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract This paper describes an investigation of several 2×2 games in iterated form. Players play the games repeatedly and are limited to mixed strategies, with particular actions chosen probabilistically. The games investigated include Prisoner’s Dilemma, Chicken, and Stag Hunt in various forms. The reward structure and the granularity of the games—number of games played per generation in the replicator dynamics—are the main factors investigated, with surprising results.

Keywords: Successful Strategy; Stochastic Game; Replicator Dynamic; Total Domination; Stag Hunt Game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:ihichp:978-3-540-26989-2_21

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DOI: 10.1007/3-540-26989-4_21

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