Bargaining in a Two-Stage Supply Chain Through Revenue-Sharing Contract

Jing Hou () and Amy Z. Zeng ()
Additional contact information
Jing Hou: Hohai University
Amy Z. Zeng: Worcester Polytechnic Institute

A chapter in Supply Chain Coordination under Uncertainty, 2011, pp 347-378 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract We focus on a bargaining problem between one supplier and one retailer that are coordinated by a revenue-sharing contract. The suppler is assumed to have the ability to influence the retailer’s profit by setting his/her target inventory level, which in turn determines the lead time. We examine the cases under which either the supplier or the retailer is dominant in the bargaining process. The key contract parameter, the acceptable range of the revenue-sharing fraction for the two players, and the maximum amount of monetary bargain space are obtained under explicit and implicit information, respectively. Numerical illustrations of the contracts for various scenarios are given to shed more insights.

Keywords: Dominance and bargaining; Nonlinear optimization; Supply chain coordination; Supply contracts (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:ihichp:978-3-642-19257-9_14

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/9783642192579

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-19257-9_14

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in International Handbooks on Information Systems from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().