Addendum to “Coordination of Supply Chains with Risk-Averse Agents” by Gan, Sethi, and Yan (2004)

Xianghua Gan, Suresh Sethi and Houmin Yan
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Xianghua Gan: The Hong Kong Polytechnic University
Houmin Yan: The Chinese University of Hong Kong

A chapter in Supply Chain Coordination under Uncertainty, 2011, pp 33-37 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract In “Coordination of Supply Chains with Risk-Averse Agents” (POMS, Volume 13, 2004), we study the issue of coordination in supply chains involving risk-averse agents, and define a coordinating contract as one that results in a Pareto-optimal solution acceptable to each agent. We then develop coordinating contracts in various cases. In the case where the supplier and the retailer each maximizes his own expected utility, we also show that our contract yields the Nash Bargaining solution. In this addendum, we first review some related works that have appeared since the publication of the paper, and then discuss directions for future research.

Keywords: Supply chain management; Risk aversion; Pareto-optimality; Coordination; Nash bargaining (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:ihichp:978-3-642-19257-9_2

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-19257-9_2

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