Dynamic Procurement, Quantity Discounts, and Supply Chain Efficiency

Feryal Erhun (), Pinar Keskinocak () and Sridhar Tayur ()
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Feryal Erhun: Stanford University
Pinar Keskinocak: Georgia Institute of Technology
Sridhar Tayur: Carnegie Mellon University

A chapter in Supply Chain Coordination under Uncertainty, 2011, pp 219-233 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract We study a model with a single supplier and a single buyer who interact multiple times before the buyer sells her product in the end-consumer market. We show that when the supplier uses a wholesale price contract, even under perfect foresight, the supplier, the buyer, and the end-consumers benefit from multiple trading opportunities versus a one-shot procurement agreement.

Keywords: Advance capacity procurement; Incremental quantity discounts; Strategic interactions; Supply chain coordination (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-19257-9_9

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