Self-Regulation in European Crowdfunding Markets

Ana Odorović ()
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Ana Odorović: Universität Hamburg, Institute of Law and Economics

Chapter Chapter 4 in Overcoming Asymmetric Information in the Crowdfunding Market, 2025, pp 165-196 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract This chapter examines the emergence of self-regulation in European crowdfunding markets through a comparative analysis of codes of conduct (CoCs) adopted by national and transnational industry associations. Drawing on economic theories of self-regulation, it develops a framework distinguishing between ‘coerced’ and ‘voluntary’ self-regulation, with the latter further divided into ‘club-like institutions’ and ‘reputation commons’. The institutional design of most CoCs supports the ‘reputation commons’ theory, evidenced by inclusive membership and weak enforcement mechanisms aimed at preserving collective reputation. A minority of CoCs—notably the Estonian example—exhibit club-like features. The content of CoC provisions also reveals perceived sources of market failure from the platforms’ perspective.

Keywords: Information asymmetry; Market-based investor protection; Voluntary disclosures; Signalling; Platform intermediation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:intchp:978-3-032-04118-0_4

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-032-04118-0_4

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