Procurement Procedures and Bid-Rigging in Brazil
César Mattos ()
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César Mattos: Office of the Legislative Counsel
A chapter in Competition Law Enforcement in the BRICS and in Developing Countries, 2016, pp 169-185 from Springer
Abstract:
Abstract Law 8,883/93, the so-called “procurement law”, includes the main provisions related to the purchases of the Brazilian government. Some key changes to this legislation have been introduced since 2002, altering the whole format of the auctions for the sake of government procurement. Our goal in this article is to assess the impact of the new rules of procurement on bid-rigging and steering of contracts. On the one hand, the transition from a first-price sealed bid auction to an (English) open bid auction facilitated cartels. On the other hand, electronic auctions introduced a welcome bidder anonymity, which had the opposite effect. The article also comments on the impact of some other new rules on the possibility of bid-rigging in Brazilian government procurement like the introduction of the possibility for post-auction negotiation on prices and the change in the time for checking bidder eligibility.
Keywords: Bid-rigging; Procurement law in Brazil; Auctions; Cartel; L41; K21; K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:intchp:978-3-319-30948-4_6
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-30948-4_6
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