Preferable System of Review Regarding Adherence to Arts 17 to 19 Commercial Agents Directive

Jan Engelmann

Chapter Chapter 5 in International Commercial Arbitration and the Commercial Agency Directive, 2017, pp 199-252 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract The preceding two chapters have outlined the possibilities and restrictions of arbitrating cross-border disputes between principals and commercial agents. The game theoretical model has shown that the system of review is a potent direct constraint on the decision-making process of arbitrators. Therefore, the goal of mitigating Ingmar’s effect through arbitration within the insurmountable constraints set by EU law appears accomplishable through an adequately designed system of review. The model has also shown that it is possible to constrain arbitrators to adhere to a certain standard of protection for commercial agents in spite of a choice of law pointing them towards a law which does not provide for termination fees. Yet, the heterogeneous methods of both pre- and post-award review throughout the four surveyed Member States leaves doubt as to whether any of them has found the right recipe to address arbitrators in this way. Therefore, a system of review which can be considered preferable will be developed in the following. It is possible to design a system of review which balances the constraints set by EU law, the results of the normative analysis of the Directive’s regime for termination fees, the inferences drawn from the game theoretical analysis regarding arbitrators’ behaviour and the conditions of review in the four surveyed Member States.

Keywords: Prima Facie; Arbitral Tribunal; Commercial Agent; Arbitral Award; Game Theoretical Analysis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:intchp:978-3-319-47449-6_5

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/9783319474496

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-47449-6_5

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in International Law and Economics from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().