Asymmetric Information, Non-cooperative Games and Impatient Agents: Modelling the Failure of Environmental Awareness Campaigns

Somdeep Chatterjee and Asim K. Karmakar ()
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Asim K. Karmakar: Jadavpur University

Chapter 15 in Analytical Issues in Trade, Development and Finance, 2014, pp 241-249 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract This chapter is based more on basic economic theory than on environmental economics, and essentially looks to address certain ‘policy issues’ on how to create a successful awareness campaign for a particular cause. In doing so, it outlines the importance of how a market should be allowed to function free of government intervention and given the presence of adequately conscious agents; such a framework suffices to run an economy. This chapter takes up the example of environment and awareness programmes related to it. Firstly, the cause of failure of such a programme is identified and then a simple interactive market mechanism is designed without any central interference, such that the same can be overcome, thereby highlighting the basic theoretical premise that is being addressed, underlying the title of this chapter.

Keywords: Environment; Game theory; Policy; Market; Government (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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DOI: 10.1007/978-81-322-1650-6_15

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