Procurement Network Formation: A Cooperative Game Approach

T. S. Chandrashekar () and Y. Narahari
Additional contact information
T. S. Chandrashekar: Indian Institute of Science

Chapter Chapter 8 in Planning Production and Inventories in the Extended Enterprise, 2011, pp 185-206 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract In this chapter, we are interested in a procurement network formation problem. We present a case for modelling the procurement network formation problem as a shortest path cooperative game. We investigate recent results in shortest path cooperative games and their implications to the procurement network formation problem. We then enhance the model for procurement network formation by incorporating asymmetry in the information that agents have. Specifically, we model the procurement network formation problem as a shortest path cooperative game with incomplete information. We point out the incentive compatible core as an appropriate solution concept for this category of games. We then review the current state of the art on the topic of incentive compatible core, pose a conjecture and end with some directions for future work.

Keywords: Supply Chain; Incomplete Information; Cooperative Game; Grand Coalition; Market Maker (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:isochp:978-1-4419-8191-2_8

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/9781441981912

DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4419-8191-2_8

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in International Series in Operations Research & Management Science from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().