Games, Risk and Uncertainty

Charles S. Tapiero
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Charles S. Tapiero: Polytechnic Institute of New York University

Chapter Chapter 12 in Engineering Risk and Finance, 2013, pp 437-463 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract This chapter provides an intuitive review of game theory models. These models provide a logical foundation to solve decision problems when “what we do and what others do” depend and affect all parties—each party with its own agenda. Game theory is thus a logical expression of a more complex rationality than the one we used when we consider only one decision maker. This chapter provides and elementary overview of games and their solutions, emphasizing issues of strategic risks. Examples are used to illustrate the solution of some games.

Keywords: Nash Equilibrium; Nash Solution; Bayesian Game; Good Response Function; Random Payoff (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4614-6234-7_12

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