 Auctions: Advances in Theory and PracticeWilliam Samuelson ()
Chapter Chapter 13 in Game Theory and Business Applications, 2014, pp 323-366 from Springer Abstract: Abstract Auctions and competitive bidding institutions are important both for empirical and theoretical reasons. The aim of this chapter is to examine the use of auctions, paying equal attention to theory and practice. While theory suggests equilibrium bidding as a benchmark, there is considerable empirical evidence (from controlled experiments and field data) that actual bidding behavior only loosely follows this normative prescription. Thus, it is important to consider the design of auction institutions anticipating actual bidding behavior. The analysis provides normative guidelines concerning “market” performance. What types of auction institutions are likely to promote efficiency? Alternatively, what auction procedures maximize the seller’s expected revenue? In combination, auction theory and the corresponding empirical evidence can provide direct answers to these questions. Keywords: Reserve Price; Bidding Strategy; Combinatorial Auction; Bidding Behavior; English Auction (search for similar items in EconPapers) There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:isochp:978-1-4614-7095-3_13 Ordering information: This item can be ordered from DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4614-7095-3_13 Access Statistics for this chapter More chapters in International Series in Operations Research & Management Science from Springer |
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