The Economics of Bidder Collusion

Robert C. Marshall (), Leslie M. Marx () and Michael J. Meurer ()
Additional contact information
Robert C. Marshall: Pennsylvania State University
Leslie M. Marx: Duke University
Michael J. Meurer: Boston University

Chapter Chapter 14 in Game Theory and Business Applications, 2014, pp 367-397 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract This Paper highlights many features of collusion at auctions that distinguish it from collusion in posted price markets, including private information by participants as well as the role of the auctioneer as a player in the game. The Susceptibility of different auction schemes to collusion, including multi-unit auctions, is explored. The design of auctions so as to be robust to collusion is also discussed.

Keywords: Reserve Price; Price Auction; English Auction; Ring Member; Uniform Price Auction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:isochp:978-1-4614-7095-3_14

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DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4614-7095-3_14

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