A Game-Theoretic Approach to Legal Settlements

William Samuelson ()
Additional contact information
William Samuelson: Boston University

Chapter Chapter 8 in Game Theory and Business Applications, 2014, pp 207-231 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract In modern economies, adjudication is the most common means of dispute resolution when voluntary alternatives such as negotiation have been exhausted. This chapter considers the incidence of out-of-court negotiated settlements versus adjudicated outcomes as predicted by the leading game-theoretic model and addresses a number of key questions. How do various offer and acceptance methods affect the terms of out-of-court settlements? Which kinds of cases settle and which go to court? How does private information about the case merits held by one or more sides affect player strategies and outcomes?

Keywords: Incentive Compatibility; Litigation Cost; Legal Cost; Direct Revelation; Offer Strategy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:isochp:978-1-4614-7095-3_8

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/9781461470953

DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4614-7095-3_8

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in International Series in Operations Research & Management Science from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().